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Abstract
Uniformly sized constituencies give voters similar influence on election outcomes.
When constituencies are set up, seats are allocated to the administrative units,
such as states or counties, using apportionment methods. According to the
impossibility result of Balinski and Young, none of the methods satisfying basic
monotonicity properties assign a rounded proportional number of seats (the
Hare-quota). We study the malapportionment of constituencies and provide a
simple bound as a function of the house size for an important class of divisor
methods, a popular, monotonic family of techniques.
Keywords: apportionment problem, divisor methods, malapportionment,
Hare-quota
JEL: D72, D78
1. Introduction
In most democratic countries, some or all members of the Parliament are
elected directly by the voters in electoral districts or (single-member) constituen-
cies. For practical considerations these constituencies are embedded in the coun-
tries’ existing administrative units, such as states or counties. To ensure equal
representation, states are allotted seats in proportion to their populations. As
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fractional seats cannot be allocated, a fair division problem ensues. This is the
so-called apportionment problem. Given an apportionment, the constituency
boundaries can be designed in each region. This is also a non-trivial task as
small towns cannot be split into two parts belonging to different constituencies.
Thus, districting also makes proportional representation more difficult.
Proportional representation is not always pursued as a goal for all insti-
tutions (e.g. European Parliament, US Senate). Furthermore, some countries
deliberately stray from proportional distribution to strengthen the represen-
tation of rural areas (e.g. Spain). Nevertheless, proportionality remains the
fundamental principle of apportionment.
The 14th Amendment of the US Constitution already established that pro-
portionality should be the key factor in apportionment. Since then, the US
Supreme Court repeatedly confirmed that no deviation from equality is too
small to challenge as long as a plan with less inequality can be presented (see
the case Kirkpatrick v. Preisler (1969)). In Europe the Venice Commission,
the advisory body of the Council of Europe in the field of constitutional law,
published a guidebook for drafting electoral laws. The Code of Good Practice in
Electoral Matters also attested that equality of voting power should be achieved
by creating constituencies of equal size (Venice Commission (2002), §13-15 in
Section 2.2).
Even if the constituencies can be equalized within a state, there will be
some deviations across states due to divisibility issues. The cited Supreme
Court decision ordered the state of Missouri to redesign the districts because
the attained 0.69% difference was not the lowest possible. In contrast, the
constituencies of Montana are 88% larger than those of Rhode Island (Biro´,
Ko´czy and Sziklai, 2015). How much of this discrepancy is inherent? Is it
possible to significantly decrease this gap? We aim to answer this question in
this short note. We focus on apportionment, and disregard the difficulties that
arise with the actual design of constituencies.
The Venice Commission itself advises that the gap should not be larger than
10% or, under exceptional circumstances, 15%. Since this requirement is hard
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to meet, many countries (including France, Germany, and Hungary) use a more
relaxed interpretation: difference is measured from the average constituency size
rather than pairwise. Indeed, the first draft of Hungary’s redesigned electoral
law in 2011 based on the stricter rule was mathematically impossible to satisfy.
In the final version it was changed to the more relaxed interpretation.
What are feasible differences in general? We look at mainstream apportion-
ment methods, establish bounds on the maximum of this difference as a function
of the house size, and illustrate our results by data from Norway. Finally we
note that the Impossibility Theorem of Balinski and Young (1982) can often be
resolved: certain methods, such as the Sainte-Lague¨/Webster method, almost
always satisfy the requirements, otherwise the Hare-quota requirement could be
replaced by a softer condition as recommended by the Venice Commission.
2. Apportionment methods
We define the apportionment problem and methods. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
be the set of states of the country. An apportionment problem (p, H) is a pair
consisting of a vector p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) of state populations pi ∈ N+ and
a positive integer H ∈ N+ denoting the number of seats in the house. An
apportionment method determines the non-negative integers a1, a2, . . . , an with∑n
i=1 ai = H, specifying how many constituencies each of the states 1, 2, . . . , n
gets. Formally, it is a function M that assigns an allotment for each apportion-
ment problem (p, H).
Let P =
∑n
i=1 pi be the population of the country, and let A =
P
H denote
the average size of a constituency. The fraction piP H =
pi
A is the respective share
of state i.
Rounding the respective shares up or down is a natural way to obtain an
apportionment. Apportionment methods that produce allotments by some form
of rounding are said to exhibit the Hare-quota, or simply quota property. Largest
remainder methods were explicitly designed with this property in mind. The
most widely known method is the Hamilton-method, which first assigns the
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lower integer part of its respective share, the so-called lower quota, to each
state, and then the remaining seats are distributed one-by-one to the states
with the largest fractional parts of their respective shares.
Divisor methods constitute another family of apportionment techniques. An
apportionment method is a divisor method if there exists a monotone increasing
function f : N → R, the divisor criterion, such that the seats are allocated to
the state with the highest the pif(s) value in each round. More precisely, suppose
that k− 1 seats are already allotted and the resulting apportionment is a, then
the kth seat goes to the state for which the fraction pif(ai) is the highest
1. The
pi
f(s) value is the rank-index or claim of state i when it has s seats. Common
divisor methods include the following2:
Adams method f(s) = s
Danish method f(s) = s+ 1/3
Harmonic mean/Dean method f(s) =
2s(s+ 1)
2s+ 1
Huntington-Hill/EP method f(s) =
√
s(s+ 1)
Sainte-Lague¨/Webster method f(s) = s+ 1/2
Jefferson/D’Hondt method f(s) = s+ 1
The divisor criteria are listed in pointwise increasing order from Adams to
Jefferson/D’Hondt; the methods favour large states over small states in the
same order. That is, the Adams method favours small states the most, while
the Jefferson/D’Hondt is the most beneficial for large states (see also Theorem 4
and Balinski and Young, 1982; Lauwers and Van Puyenbroeck, 2006; Marshall
et al., 2002). The principal advantage of divisor methods is their immunity to
paradoxes related to monotonicity, such as the Alabama-paradox.
1We assume that all of the pi
f(ai)
values are distinct. Ties are unlikely, for real data no
tie-breaking rules are specified.
2EP stands for Equal Proportions method. Aliases are due to reinventions.
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We call divisor methods with s ≤ f(s) ≤ s + 1 regular divisor methods.
More exotic divisor methods like the Imperiali (f(s) = s + 2) or the Macau
(f(s) = 2s) methods are not regular. Interestingly, while the Imperiali-method
favours large states even more than the Jefferson/D’Hondt, the Macau-method
is drastically small-state-friendly. Hence, it is false to conclude that the larger
the divisor, the better it is for the large states.
The class of regular divisor methods is larger than it seems. The distribution
of seats only depends on the relative order of claims, which does not change if
all the claims are multiplied with the same (positive) number.
Remark 1. For any µ, ν such that νµ ≤ 1 the divisor method with f(s) = µs+ν
is regular and equivalent with the divisor method with fˆ(s) = s+ ν/µ.
This explains, why the Sainte-Lague¨/Webster method is sometimes defined
with f(s) = 2s+ 1.
A third branch of apportionment methods aims to minimize the range of pop-
ulations. The minimum range method of Burt and Harris (1963) and Gilbert
and Schatz (1964) minimizes the maximum disparity in representation between
any two states, while the Leximin method (Biro´, Ko´czy and Sziklai, 2015) lexi-
cographically minimizes the maximum departure, that is, the difference between
the population of any constituency and the average constituency size.
Malapportionment measures have been studied by (Koppel and Diskin, 2008;
Samuels and Snyder, 2001; Schubert and Press, 1964). We look at departure
from the average constituency size as a more explicit and intuitive measure of
malapportionment.
3. Departure as a malapportionment measure
Let the relative difference displayed by the constituencies of state i be de-
noted by
δi =
pi
ai
−A
A
,
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and let di = |δi| be the departure, its absolute value. Maximum departure of an
allotment, a = (a1, . . . , an) is the maximum of the di values for i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Let li =
⌊
pi
P H
⌋
and ui =
⌈
pi
P H
⌉
denote the lower and upper quotas of state
i, respectively, and let βi (for best case) and ωi (for worst case) denote the
minimum and maximum differences achievable for state i when it gets the lower
or upper integer part of its respective share.
βi = min
(∣∣∣∣∣
pi
li
−A
A
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
∣∣∣∣∣
pi
ui
−A
A
∣∣∣∣∣
)
, β = max
i∈N
βi,
ωi = max
(∣∣∣∣∣
pi
li
−A
A
∣∣∣∣∣ ,
∣∣∣∣∣
pi
ui
−A
A
∣∣∣∣∣
)
, ω = max
i∈N
ωi.
Here β, the maximum of the βi values, is a natural, not necessarily tight lower
bound on the maximum departure for any apportionment. Similarly, the maxi-
mum of the ωi values, denoted by ω, is an upper bound for any apportionment
which satisfies the Hare-quota. If an apportionment does not satisfy Hare-quota,
then it may have a departure larger than ω.
The β and ω bounds indicate that proportional representation relies on our
ability to round the critical states in a good direction. Unfortunately, keeping
the total at H forces us to allocate seats suboptimally. Suppose that there
are seats left after an optimal rounding: Which state should we give them to?
Should each state get only one extra seat (rounding it up rather than down
as it would optimal)? Rounding in the wrong direction may increase departure
drastically for small states, while for larger states even adding multiple seats has
a minor effect on the relative difference, that is, departure, making such states
ideal buffers to store seats that would mess up the apportionment. A similar
argument applies to the case when the optimal allocation would distribute too
many seats.
Enforcing quota ensures that the departure will not exceed ω, but the ad-
ditional constraint also makes it difficult to stay close to β, since we cannot
use states as buffers to lend/borrow problematic or desperately needed seats
for critical states without creating too much inequality. What are these critical
states? They are small states, which are only a few times the size of the average
6
Population
810 1000 8200
H=33
respective share 2.67 3.29 27.03
Adams 3 4 26
H=35
respective share 2.83 3.39 28.67
Jefferson/D’Hondt 2 3 30
Imperiali 2 2 31
Macau 10 11 14
Table 1: Quota violations by regular and non-regular divisor methods (in red and boldface).
Note that for regular-methods the violation appears only at the largest state.
constituency. It is easy to prove the following upper bounds:
β ≤ β def= 1
2lsm + 1
,
ω ≤ ω def=

1
lsm
if lsm > 0,
∞ if lsm = 0;
where lsm denotes the lower integer part of the smallest state’s respective share
(Ko´czy, Biro´ and Sziklai, 2017).
4. Examples
Both the minimum range and the Leximin methods tends to treat large
states as buffers (Burt and Harris, 1963; Biro´, Ko´czy and Sziklai, 2015): large
states may get more seats than their upper quota or less seats than their lower
quota in order to balance out the small critical states. This is not surprising at
all, considering that the average constituency size in large states is less affected
if the allotted number of seats changes. Curiously enough, this can be observed
for divisor methods too.
Consider a country with three states (Table 1). When the house size is fixed
at 33, the Adams method, which favours the small states, gives state 1 and 2
their upper quotas. To pull this off it gives the largest state, state 3, one less
7
seats than its lower quota. In contrast, when H = 35, the Jefferson/D’Hondt
method gives the small states their lower quota and, to account for the excess
seat, it gives the largest state more than its upper quota. In the next section,
Theorem 6 states that if a quota violation happens, there will always be a smaller
state where no violation appears. Empirical data shows that for regular divisor
methods, quota violations happen only for some of the largest states. However,
this is no longer true for the Imperiali- or the Macau-method (Table 1).
Quota violations are more common for Adams and the Jefferson/D’Hondt
methods than for the Huntington-Hill/EP and the Sainte-Lagu¨e/Webster meth-
ods (Ko´czy, Biro´ and Sziklai, 2017; Tsitouras, 2011). Nevertheless all divisor
methods violate quota from time to time.
Figure 1 depicts the maximum departure produced by various methods on
Norwegian data under different house sizes. To keep the figure transparent we
only sketched four solutions. The Leximin method, devised to minimize depar-
ture, coincides with β in this case. We computed other regular divisor methods
(like the Danish and the EP methods) too, and none of them violated the ω
bound. Is this true in general? Empirical evidence from a number of countries
suggests that regular divisor methods never produce a maximum departure that
exceeds this bound. In the next section, we will prove this observation for reg-
ular divisor methods that have a linear divisor criterion.
5. Bounds for regular divisor methods
Regular divisor methods with a linear divisor criterion include the Adams,
Danish, Sainte-Lagu¨e/Webster, and Jefferson/D’Hondt methods. In this section
we prove that no such method violates the ω bound. It is a well-known fact
that divisor methods violate the Hare-quota property; regular divisor methods
cannot violate both upper and lower quota at the same time (Pukelsheim, 2014,
Section 11.4).
Lemma 2. For any regular divisor method and apportionment problem (p, H),
if there exists a state that received more seats that its upper quota then each
8
ω = 0.5
ω = 0.333
ω = 0.25
ω = 0.2
Figure 1: Apportionment over Norwegian counties. Leximin coincides with β, Saint-
Lagu¨e/Webster is near, Adams is somewhat worse, while the Jefferson/D’Hondt method per-
forms poorly, reaching ω several times.
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state received at least its lower quota. Conversely, if there exists a state which
received less seats that its lower quota then each state received at most its upper
quota.
Proof. Suppose that state i received k seats, which is strictly more than its
upper quota. By contradiction, suppose there is a state, j that received m
seats, which is less than its lower quota. Let ` ≤ m be the number of seats j
had when i received its kth seat. Then
A ≥ pi
ui
≥ pi
f(k − 1) >
pj
f(`)
≥ pj
f(m)
≥ pj
lj
≥ A
which is a contradiction. The average constituency size A lies between the
upper and the lower quotas, hence the first and last inequalities are trivial. The
second follows from ui ≤ k − 1 ≤ f(k − 1) and the (strict) third one from
that M incremented i and not j when i had k− 1 seat and j had `. The fourth
inequality follows from the choice of ` and m and the monotonicity of f . Finally,
f(m) ≤ m+ 1 ≤ lj .
Lemma 3. Lemma 2 extends to the Leximin method.
Proof. Assume the contrary, and consider a transfer of seats between the viola-
tors on different sides. The result is a lexicographic improvement.
For the sake of completeness, we prove a well-known property of the Adams
and the Jefferson/D’Hondt methods. Namely, that they only violate the Hare-
quote in one direction (Pukelsheim, 2014, Section 11.4).
Theorem 4. The Jefferson/D’Hondt method may only violate the upper, the
Adams method only the lower quota.
Proof. For the Jefferson/D’Hondt method, f(s) = s + 1. By contradiction,
suppose that state i receives less seats than its lower quota. Then, there must
be a state j which received its upper quota (and lj 6= uj). That is at one
point state i had ` < li seats, state j had lj seats and the Jefferson method
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incremented state j, which implies that pif(`) <
pj
f(lj)
. However this leads to a
contradiction as
A ≤ pi
li
≤ pi
`+ 1
=
pi
f(`)
<
pj
f(lj)
=
pj
uj
< A.
Now let us fix f(s) = s. By contradiction suppose that state i receives more
seats than its upper quota. Then there must be a state j which received its
lower quota (and lj 6= uj). That is at one point state i had ui seats, state j
had ` ≤ lj seats and the Adams method incremented state i, which implies that
pi
f(ui)
>
pj
f(`) . This leads to
A >
pi
ui
=
pi
f(ui)
>
pj
f(`)
≥ pj
lj
≥ A,
which is a contradiction.
Sometimes it is more convenient to work with the inverse of the claim func-
tion: i.e. with f(s)pi rather than with
pi
f(s) . In such cases the divisor methods in-
crement the states with the smallest f(s)pi value. The following lemma is needed
for estimating the departure.
Lemma 5. For any apportionment problem (p, H) and for any i, j ∈ N , ljpj ≤
ui
pi
.
Proof.
lj
pj
=
bpjA c
pj
≤ 1
A
≤ d
pi
A e
pi
=
ui
pi
. (1)
Regular divisor methods, just like the Leximin method, use large states as
buffers to allot or acquire extra seats. The next theorem formulates a weaker
statement for regular linear divisor methods, namely, that if the number of seats
allotted to a state exceeds its upper (respectively lower) quota, then states which
are allotted their lower (upper) quota are necessarily smaller.
Theorem 6. Let Mf be a regular divisor method with a linear division criterion.
If state i receives more seats than its upper quota then each state j which received
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its lower quota is smaller, that is pj < pi. If state j receives less seats than its
lower quota then each state i which received its upper quota is smaller, that is
pi < pj.
Proof. By Remark 1 we may assume that f(s) = s + ν, where ν ≤ 1. If i
received more seats than its upper quota, then due to Lemma 2 there must be
a state j that received its lower quota, that is
f(lj)
pj
> f(ui)pi .
f(lj)
pj
>
f(ui)
pi
⇐⇒ lj + ν
pj
>
ui + ν
pi
Eq.1
=⇒
ν
pj
>
ν
pi
⇐⇒ pi > pj .
For the second part, suppose that j received ` number of seats which is
strictly less than its lower quota. Then
f(li)
pi
<
f(`)
pj
≤ f(lj − 1)
pj
=
lj + ν − 1
pj
.
We may assume that ν − 1 < 0, as ν = 1 yields the Jefferson/D’Hondt
method which does not violate the lower quota. If there is a state that received
less seats than its lower quota then by Lemma 2 there must be a state i which
received its upper quota for which ui 6= li, i.e. li = ui − 1. Let us suppose that
ν − 1 < 0, then
f(li)
pi
<
f(lj − 1)
pj
⇐⇒ li + ν
pi
<
lj + ν − 1
pj
⇐⇒
ui + ν − 1
pi
<
lj + ν − 1
pj
Eq.1
=⇒ ν − 1
pi
<
ν − 1
pj
⇐⇒ pj > pi.
Finally, we can state our main result.
Theorem 7. Let Mf be a regular divisor method with a linear division criterion.
Then for any apportionment problem (p, H) and state i ∈ N ,∣∣∣∣∣
pi
Mf (p,H)i
−A
A
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ω. (2)
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Proof. Again by Remark 1 we may assume that f(s) = s + ν, where ν ≤ 1.
Consider an apportionment problem (p, H) where the upper quota is violated
by Mf . Due to Lemma 2, the lower quota cannot be violated at the same time.
Let i be a state that received k seats, which is more than its upper quota.
By Lemma 2 there is a state j that received its lower quota. That is, at one
point i has k − 1 seats, j has lj seats, and the divisor method increments i,
therefore pif(k−1) ≥ pjf(lj) . Note that by Theorem 6, pi > pj . This implies
pi
f(k−1)+1−ν ≥ pif(lj)+1−ν . Thus∣∣∣∣ pik −AA
∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ pik−1+ν+1−ν −AA
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
pi
f(k−1)+1−ν −A
A
∣∣∣∣∣ =
−
(
pi
f(k−1)+1−ν −A
A
)
≤ −
( pj
f(lj)+1−ν −A
A
)
=
−
( pj
uj
−A
A
)
=
∣∣∣∣∣
pj
uj
−A
A
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ωj ≤ ω.
Now let j be a state that received m seats, which is less than its lower quota.
By Lemma 2 there is a state i that received its upper quota. Let ` be the number
of seats j had when i received its upper quota. So, at one point, j had ` ≤ m
seats, i had li seats and the method incremented i, therefore
pj
f(`) ≤ pif(li) . By
Theorem 6 pi > pj , which in turn implies that
pj
f(`)−ν ≤ pif(li)−ν for 0 ≤ ν < 1.
Thus ∣∣∣∣ pjm −AA
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣
pj
m+ν−ν −A
A
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
∣∣∣∣∣
pj
f(`)−ν −A
A
∣∣∣∣∣ =
pj
f(`)−ν −A
A
≤
pi
f(li)−ν −A
A
=
pi
li
−A
A
=∣∣∣∣∣
pi
li
−A
A
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ωj ≤ ω.
We exclude ν = 1 due to the lack of lower quota violation.
6. Discussion
Our results have a direct application. Given a regular linear divisor method
and a vector of state populations, we can pin down a house size which guar-
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antees that the maximum departure does not exceed a given limit (e.g. the
recommendation of the Venice Commission).
For an illustration we look at the Norwegian Parliament: The Storting ac-
commodates 169 seats, which are elected in 19 counties. Seats are distributed
according to a modified version of the Sainte-Lague¨/Webster method using ad-
justed population data. When calculating the size of a county, its population is
adjusted with its area, and instead of the usual f(s) = s+ 1/2 divisor they use
f(0) = 0.7 for s = 0. Interestingly, in practice this modification never plays a
role.
Aust-Agder, the smallest county in this adjusted sense, gets 4 seats, and its
respective share is between 3 and 4 seats for the current house size. In other
words, even in the worst case the maximum departure will not exceed 33%
(see Figure 1). The Sainte-Lague¨/Webster method performs quite well on the
Norwegian data, and the actual departure is much lower, but fluctuations in
the population data (e.g. due to migration) are quite common and the method
is known to produce allotments on the ω bound (see the Belgian example in
Ko´czy, Biro´ and Sziklai, 2017). By increasing the house size by a mere 6 seats
to 175 the respective share of Aust-Agder is between 4 and 5 seats and ω, the
upper bound for maximum departure drops to 25%.
Empirical evidence hints that all regular divisor methods (including the Dean
and the Huntington-Hill/EP methods) stay within the ω bound. This, however
does not solve the case of the USA. In order to reduce the huge gap between the
constituencies of Rhode Island and Montana, the size of the House of Represen-
tatives would have to be increased to 871, more than twice its current size (Biro´,
Ko´czy and Sziklai, 2015)! Here another approach may be more rewarding: the
Leximin method is known to coincide with β most of the time, for which β
composes a – much lower – upper bound.
Where even the Leximin method performs poorly, increasing the size of the
administrative regions can greatly decrease the departure. Biro´, Ko´czy and
Sziklai (2015) present the case of Hungary, where an apportionment based on
regions rather than counties reduces departure from 15.28% to 3.37%. Decreas-
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ing the number of administrative regions from 20 to 7 increased lsm, the lower
quota of the smallest region, from 2 to 10. The improvement is, therefore, not
due to sheer luck as the corresponding ω¯ reduces from 50% to 10% and β¯ from
20% to less than 5%!
Balinski and Young (1982) argued that there is no perfect apportionment
method: no method that satisfies Hare-quota, and avoids the Alabama and
population paradoxes at the same time. Empirical evidence shows that the
Huntington-Hill/EP and the Sainte-Lague¨/Webster methods hardly ever violate
quota. More importantly they propose allotments, which are usually close to the
Leximin solution. For countries where monotonicity issues are a real problem,
these methods constitute a good compromise as well.
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